Ich will keine Tradition aus dem freitäglichen Foreign-Affairs-Lesetipp machen, aber der Artikel Why Only Germany Can Fix the Euro über die Euro-Krise ist wieder mal lesenswert (womit ich nur meine: wert, dass man ihn liest – das ist nicht automatisch eine Zustimmung zu den Inhalten). Im Kern dreht er sich darum, dass Deutschland durch seine auf Währungsstabilität fixierte Politik die aktuelle Euro-Krise mitverursacht hat, aber sich seiner Rolle als führende Wirtschaftsmacht – und damit als Hauptverantwortlichem für die Rettung des Euro – nicht stellen will:
This complex of causes does however have a common root: Germany’s failure to act as a responsible hegemon in Europe. It is not that Germany should be unseating democracies and enforcing deflation, as it has attempted to do by installing Papademos in Greece and Monti in Italy. Rather, it should be stabilizing the eurozone by providing a set of public goods that the institutions and policies of the region have singularly failed to supply.
Interessant dabei ist, dass Deutschland hier nicht vorgeworfen wird, die führende Wirtschaftsmacht Europas oder gar der Welt zu sein. Sondern diese Macht, die mit der des imperialen Großbritannien verglichen wird, nicht anzuerkennen und entsrpechend umzusetzen:
Throughout much of the twentieth century, the “German Problem” — the fact that Germany was too strong, too powerful, and too economically dynamic for the rest of Europe — bedeviled European elites. “Keeping Germany down” through NATO and European integration was seen as the solution. The problem today is not German strength but German weakness — a reluctance to take up its hegemonic role. It is not too late for Germany to change course. Even though they have profited handsomely so far from the current arrangement, they must realize by now that its model was always based on shaky foundations, cannot be generalized to all states, and has reached the limits of its sustainability. If the euro ends up collapsing — and the European Union with it – Germany will clearly be much worse of. Many of its markets will disappear while the new deutschmark soars to unknown heights. In such a world, the ‘old’ German problem would be back at the heart of the ‘new’ Europe.
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